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EMELDI v. UNIVERSITY OF OREGON  
BRINGS THE STUDENT-PROFESSOR 
RELATIONSHIP INTO THE WORKPLACE 
Molly Schranz* 
Abstract: On June 9, 2012, in Emeldi v. University of Oregon, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment to 
the publicly-funded University of Oregon in a Title IX suit brought by a 
female Ph.D. student claiming retaliation following her complaints of 
gender discrimination. By applying the Title VII framework used for em-
ployment discrimination cases, the court analogized the graduate stu-
dent’s relationship to that of an employee and found that the student’s al-
legations alone were sufficient to create a factual dispute. Because the 
Title VII framework frequently allows these types of allegations to survive 
summary judgment, a student’s allegations are more likely to be found 
non-speculative under the Ninth Circuit’s application of the Title VII 
framework to Title IX cases. This may result in more Title IX discrimina-
tion cases surpassing the summary judgment stage, thereby empowering 
students to speak out against discrimination. 
Introduction 
 After effectively withdrawing from the University of Oregon’s Col-
lege of Education as a result of being unable to procure a replacement 
dissertation advisor, Monica Emeldi, a female Ph.D. student in the Col-
lege of Education’s Department of Special Education (Department), 
sued the institution.1 She alleged that her male faculty dissertation 
committee chair engaged in gender discrimination before resigning 
from supervising her dissertation.2 She also asserted that the University 
of Oregon (University) prevented her from completing her Ph.D. pro-
gram in retaliation for having complained of gender-based institutional 
bias in her program.3 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013) 
1 Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi II ), 673 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir.), amended by 698 F.3d 
715 (9th Cir. 2012). 
2 See id. at 1221–22. 
3 Id. at 1221. 
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 Emeldi claimed that the University retaliated against her in viola-
tion of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which bars 
gender-based discrimination by federally funded institutions.4 Because 
no framework exists for deciding what a plaintiff must prove to prevail 
on a motion for summary judgment for a Title IX retaliation claim, cir-
cuit courts have applied the same framework used to decide retaliation 
claims under Title VII, which prevents gender discrimination in the 
workplace.5 In a Title VII claim, a plaintiff who is unable to produce 
direct evidence of retaliation must make “a prima facie case of retalia-
tion by showing (a) that he or she was engaged in a protected activity, 
(b) that he or she suffered an adverse action, and (c) that there was a 
causal link between the two.”6 Following the plaintiff’s prima facie 
showing, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating a legitimate, 
non-retaliatory reason for the action.7 If the defendant is able to do so, 
the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the reason is pretextual by ei-
ther showing that the discriminatory reason likely motivated the em-
ployer’s actions or that the employer’s non-retaliatory reason lacks cre-
dence.8 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granted sum-
mary judgment for the University concluding that Emeldi’s complaints 
of gender discrimination and institutional bias were nothing more than 
speculation.9 Emeldi appealed the decision, arguing that she had pro-
vided sufficient allegations to establish that there was a genuine issue of 
fact.10 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court’s decision holding that Emeldi had provided sufficient evi-
dence to create a factual issue as to whether there was a causal link be-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Title IX Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (stating that 
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”); Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1221. 
5 Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1223 & n.2; see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race, 
color, national origin, and religion); see, e.g., Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharm. of Union 
Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying the Title VII framework to a Title IX re-
taliation claim); Franzier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 67 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); 
Clinger v. N.M. Highlands Univ., Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) (same). 
6 Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1223. 
7 Id. at 1224. 
8 Id. 
9 See Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi I ), No. 08–6346-HO, 2010 WL 2330190, at *4 (D. 
Or. June 4, 2010), rev’d, 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012), amended by 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
10 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1223, 1229. 
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tween Emeldi’s protected activity and adverse action.11 The Ninth Cir-
cuit also held that there was sufficient evidence to create a factual issue 
as to whether the resignation of her supervisor and her inability to se-
cure replacement was pretext for retaliation.12 
 In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit focused on Title VII 
standards, analogizing Emeldi’s claims to those of employees making 
prima facie cases under Title VII claims, and relied heavily on circum-
stantial evidence.13 Because the degree of proof necessary to establish a 
prima facie case for Title VII claims on summary judgment is minimal, 
the court was able to find a causal link and factual issue of pretext 
based only on Emeldi’s allegations of discrimination, including incon-
sistent comments from Emeldi herself.14 By comparing Emeldi’s cir-
cumstantial evidence to that provided in Title VII cases, the court sug-
gested that student-professor relations be considered analogous to that 
of an employee-employer relationship.15 As a result of this more lenient 
standard, students will not be deterred from advancing pleas of institu-
tional bias or discrimination.16 
I. Emeldi’s Allegations of Discrimination and Retaliation 
 When Emeldi’s original dissertation chair went on sabbatical in 
2005, she asked another professor, Robert Horner, to serve as her dis-
sertation chair.17 During the period in which Horner served as her 
chair, Emeldi issued a series of complaints of sex discrimination against 
the Department.18 After numerous complaints made by Emeldi and 
other Ph.D. students, Emeldi wrote a memo to Mike Bullis, Dean of the 
                                                                                                                      
11 Id. at 1229. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. at 1225, 1227 (comparing Emeldi’s withdrawal to that of constructive dis-
charge, in which an employer makes working conditions so difficult that it overcomes the 
motivation of a competent employee). 
14 See id. at 1223 (quoting Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that because discrimination cases usually need significant amounts of evidence 
and the opportunity to evaluate the witnesses, it is important that courts protect the em-
ployee’s right to a trial)). 
15 See id. at 1224–25.  The court in Emeldi II compared Emeldi’s complaints to the pro-
tected activity in Moyo v. Gomez. See id.; Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 1994). In 
Moyo, a prison guard filed a Title VII claim against his employer, a department of correc-
tions, alleging that he was fired for protesting against discrimination against black inmates. 
Moyo, 40 F.3d at 984. 
16 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1225 (stating that “[w]omen students should not be de-
terred from advancing pleas that they be treated as favorably as male students”). 
17 Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi II ), 673 F.3d 1218, 1221 (9th Cir.), amended by 698 F.3d 
715 (9th Cir. 2012). 
18 See id. 
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College of Education, in May 2007 summarizing the students’ concern 
about the lack of female role models and support for female Ph.D. 
candidates.19 Although the University contended that only Bullis knew 
of the memo, Emeldi claimed that she was told all faculty members had 
access to a copy and that her dissatisfaction was “common knowl-
edge.”20 
 In July 2007, Emeldi submitted her research plans for her disserta-
tion to Horner.21 Horner responded with feedback, commenting posi-
tively on her effort and describing the project as “‘tremendously inter-
esting.’”22 He also noted, however, that he struggled to find “‘details 
that [could] be examined within a dissertation.’”23 
 In October 2007, Emeldi met with two administrators at the Uni-
versity, one of whom was Marian Friestad, and voiced complaints that 
the Department held a bias in favor of male doctoral candidates and did 
not demonstrate similar support for female candidates.24 Emeldi cited 
Horner as an example, describing him as being distant and inaccessible 
to her.25 According to Emeldi, Friestad then notified Horner of Emeldi’s 
allegations of discrimination.26 Friestad, however, claimed that she only 
discussed Emeldi’s dissertation with Horner and not the discrimination 
complaints.27 A few weeks later, Horner resigned as Emeldi’s dissertation 
chair and he then allegedly told other Department members that in-
stead of being granted a Ph.D., she should be directed into an Ed.D., a 
less prestigious program.28 
 After Horner’s resignation, Emeldi asked fifteen other faculty 
members in the Department to serve as her dissertation chair, yet was 
unable to procure a replacement.29 While Emeldi was pursuing a new 
                                                                                                                      
19 See id. 
20 See id. Emeldi and other students specifically complained to Bullis about the lack of 
adequate support for female Ph.D. candidates. Id. The memo included fifteen topics, in-
cluding students’ concern that there was a lack of female role models in tenured faculty 
positions at the University. Id. 
21 Id. at 1222 n.1. 
22 Id. 
23 Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1222 n.1. 
24 Id. at 1222. 
25 Id. Emeldi later alleged that Horner gave a male student more office space and 
technology than similar female students, that he ignored Emeldi and did not make eye 
contact with her, and that he gave more attention to male students in graduate student 
meetings. See id. at 1227. 
26 See id. at 1222. 
27 See id. 
28 Id. The University denied that Horner made these comments. See id. 
29 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1222. Some of the faculty members said they were too busy 
or unqualified to serve as her dissertation chair. Id. 
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chair, she filed a complaint under the University’s internal grievance 
procedure, which she claims contributed to her inability to obtain a 
new chair.30 The University countered that she neglected to ask two 
faculty members—including her former dissertation chair who had re-
turned from his sabbatical—who might have been well suited to super-
vise her dissertation.31 Unable to find a dissertation chair and therefore 
unable to complete her Ph.D., Emeldi abandoned the program, effec-
tively withdrawing from the University.32 
 Emeldi filed suit against the University on October 29, 2008 in 
Oregon state court.33 The University successfully removed to the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Oregon, which granted summary 
judgment for the University holding that Emeldi’s memo expressing 
her dissatisfaction did not constitute protected activity.34 The district 
court rejected Emeldi’s allegations that there was a causal link between 
the University’s adverse actions and reasoned that her complaints were 
speculative.35 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary 
judgment de novo.36 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
holding, finding that Emeldi had sufficient evidence to establish a 
prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX.37 Specifically, by viewing 
Emeldi’s complaints as speaking out against gender discrimination, the 
court found that the complaints were protected activity.38 By analogiz-
ing her to a discharged employee, the court held that the resignation 
of Emeldi’s male dissertation chair after she complained constituted 
adverse action because it rendered her unable to finish her degree.39 
Most significantly, the court held that there was enough circumstantial 
evidence to establish a causal link between Emeldi’s complaint and 
Horner’s resignation.40 The circumstantial evidence included the prox-
imity in time between Emeldi’s complaints and Horner’s resignation, 
Emeldi’s theory of how Horner found out about her complaints, and 
                                                                                                                      
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. 
35 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1223; Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi I ), No. 08–6346-HO, 
2010 WL 2330190, at *4 (D. Or. June 4, 2010), rev’d, 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012), amended 
by 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012). 
36 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1223. 
37 See id. at 1229. 
38 See id. at 1224. 
39 See id. at 1225. 
40 See id. at 1227. 
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evidence of Horner’s gender-based animus in other contexts.41 Finding 
that Emeldi had established a prima facie case of retaliation, the court 
then used the same circumstantial evidence when reasoning that the 
University stated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Horner’s res-
ignation and for Emeldi’s inability to secure a replacement.42 The 
Ninth Circuit therefore stated that a factual issue existed as to whether 
Horner’s resignation and Emeldi’s inability to secure replacement were 
in fact, pretext for retaliation.43 
II. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit Apply the Same 
Title VII Framework to Reach Opposing Conclusions 
 In order to analyze Emeldi’s Title IX claim, both the district court 
and the Ninth Circuit applied the same three-part Title VII framework 
requiring a plaintiff lacking direct evidence of retaliation to make out a 
prima facie case of retaliation.44 Both courts, in assessing her claim, re-
quired Emeldi to show that she was engaged in a protected activity, that 
she suffered an adverse action, and that there was a causal link between 
the two.45 The two courts, however, reached opposing conclusions re-
garding the sufficiency of Emeldi’s allegations to survive summary 
judgment.46 Both courts reached their initial decision to apply the Title 
VII framework to a Title IX claim by looking at the Supreme Court’s 
2005 interpretation of Title IX’s breadth in Jackson v. Birmingham Board 
of Education, as well as sister circuits’ adoption of the Title VII frame-
work, in order to present a prima facie case for retaliation under Title 
IX.47 
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. at 1226–27. 
42 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1228. 
43 See id. at 1224, 1228–29. 
44 See Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi II ), 673 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir.), amended by 698 
F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012); Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi I ), No. 08–6346-HO, 2010 WL 
2330190, at *2 (D. Or. June 4, 2010), rev’d, 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012), amended by 698 
F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012). 
45 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1223. 
46 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1228; Emeldi I, 2010 WL 2330190, at *4. 
47 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1228 (citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 
167, 173 (2005). In Jackson, the Supreme Court held that retaliation against a person who 
has complained of sex discrimination is a form of gender-based discrimination that is ac-
tionable under Title IX. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173. The Jackson case dealt with a high 
school basketball coach who alleged that he had suffered adverse actions after complain-
ing of sex discrimination in the funding of his high school’s athletic program. Id. at 171. 
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A. The District Court Views Emeldi’s Allegations as Speculation 
 The district court granted summary judgment for the University, 
finding that Emeldi did not engage in protected activity and that even 
if it was found that she had, there was no causal link between that activ-
ity and the adverse action.48 The district court reached this conclusion 
by holding that protected activity in this context involves complaints of 
discrimination and that the only record that supported Emeldi’s com-
plaints of discrimination were her own declarations.49 The court con-
cluded that Emeldi’s memo to her supervisors did not raise allegations 
of gender discrimination.50 Additionally, the district court concluded 
that Friestad and Horner’s testimonies denying that Emeldi discussed 
her concerns about discrimination with them lowered Emeldi’s allega-
tions to mere speculation.51 
 Even accepting the possibility that her “alleged protected activity 
[was] borderline at best,” the district court found it “difficult if not im-
possible” to find causation because Emeldi did not produce sufficient 
evidence that anyone on the dissertation committee knew that Emeldi 
had made complaints of discrimination.52 The district court did not go 
any further in analyzing the second prong of the Title IX test, noting 
that there was nothing beyond Emeldi’s own speculation and percep-
tion that her failure to find a replacement chair was caused by her 
complaints of discrimination.53 
B. The Ninth Circuit Finds Emeldi’s Allegations Sufficient to Establish a 
Genuine Question of Fact 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different view of Emeldi’s al-
legations.54 Its approach emphasized not only the standard required in 
reviewing a summary judgment claim—that the evidence be viewed in a 
light favorable to the plaintiff—but also that “a plaintiff need only 
make a minimal threshold showing of retaliation” to establish a prima 
facie case.55 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Emeldi I, 2010 WL 2330190, at *3–4. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. at *3. 
51 Id. at *3–4. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. at *4. 
54 Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1230. 
55 Id. at 1223. 
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 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that in order to 
consider Emeldi’s activity as protected, a complaint of discrimination 
was required.56 The Ninth Circuit differed, however, in finding that 
Emeldi had alleged facts, that if found to be true, would demonstrate 
that she engaged in a Title IX protected activity.57 The court reached 
this first holding by concluding that the protected status of her alleged 
statements was sufficient.58 Unlike the district court that dismissed her 
allegations as speculation and borderline protected activity at best, the 
Ninth Circuit had “no doubt” that Title IX empowered Emeldi to com-
plain.59 
 The Ninth Circuit also used Title VII language to hold that 
Horner’s resignation constituted an adverse action.60 The court 
adopted the standard set forth in 2006 by the Supreme Court in Bur-
lington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, that an adverse action is 
present in a Title VII claim when the challenged action might have en-
couraged a reasonable person not to pursue a charge of discrimina-
tion.61 The court concluded that a reasonable person, who had been 
abandoned by her supervisor and unable to find a replacement, could 
justifiably feel that these events were materially adverse, and therefore 
could have been dissuaded from complaining.62 The court analogized 
Emeldi’s withdrawal from the University to that of constructive dis-
charge, a situation in which a retaliating employer creates working 
conditions so difficult that an ordinary worker would lose motivation to 
remain on the job.63 
 Having established that Emeldi’s complaints were sufficient for a 
jury to find that they were protected activity and that Horner’s resigna-
tion was an adverse action, the court examined whether there was a 
causal link between the two.64 Both the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit agreed that causation may be established by circumstantial evi-
                                                                                                                      
56 See id. at 1224. 
57 See id. at 1225. 
58 See id. at 1224–25 (noting that “the protected status of her alleged statements holds 
whether or not she ultimately would be able to prove her contentions”). 
59 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1224; Emeldi I, 2010 WL 2330190, at *3. 
60 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1225; Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 
2008); Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Ariz., Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2004); Yart-
zoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987). 
61 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 
548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (quoting Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
64 See id. at 1226. 
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dence.65 The Ninth Circuit, however, crucially distinguished that at the 
prima facie stage of a retaliation case, the causal link element is con-
strued so broadly that the plaintiff only has to prove that the two ele-
ments are not completely unrelated.66 By shifting this already very 
minimal burden of proof, the Ninth Circuit was able to accept Emeldi’s 
allegations as sufficient rather than having to dismiss them as mere 
speculation.67 Based on these allegations, the court found that there 
were several circumstances establishing retaliation.68 
 The court found that the proximity in time between Emeldi’s com-
plaints to Friestad and Horner’s resignation was indicative of retalia-
tion.69 Relying on Emeldi’s recollection that she complained to Friestad 
about Horner favoring male Ph.D. candidates, the court found that 
Emeldi had established a theory regarding Horner’s discovery of her 
discrimination complaints.70 Additionally Emeldi offered her own con-
tentions that Horner gave more attention and support to male students, 
that he ignored her, and that he did not make eye contact with her.71 
 Having found that Emeldi established a prima facie case of retalia-
tion, the court acknowledged that the University had stated a legitimate 
non-retaliatory reason for the challenged action by suggesting that 
Horner resigned as a result of Emeldi refusing to follow his research 
advice.72 The court also noted that the faculty members Emeldi sought 
as replacements had legitimate reasons for not wanting to work with 
her, such as being unavailable or unqualified to supervise her disserta-
tion.73 The court additionally held that Emeldi presented evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could find that the University’s reasons 
were in fact pretextual.74 It based this holding on the same analysis used 
to find causation from circumstantial evidence in the prima facie case.75 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id.; Emeldi I, 2010 WL 2330190, at *3. 
66 Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1226 (quoting Poland, 494 F.3d at 1180 n.2). 
67 See id. at 1228. 
68 See id. at 1227. 
69 Id. at 1226. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1227. 
72 Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1227–28. 
73 Id. at 1228–29. 
74 See id. at 1229. 
75 Id. 
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III. Using Title VII’s Lower Burden of Proof to Achieve the 
Policy Goals Underlying Title IX 
 The Ninth Circuit distinguished its analysis from the district court 
by thoroughly adapting the Title VII framework for a Title IX retalia-
tion claim.76 Where the district court swiftly adopted that the Title IX 
retaliation claim should be analyzed under the Title VII framework, the 
Ninth Circuit took the time to articulate three reasons why it choose to 
follow sister circuits in adopting the Title VII framework.77 The Ninth 
Circuit’s attention to defining these reasons is indicative of its deeper 
analysis of the case.78 By carefully examining the policy behind adopt-
ing a Title VII framework, the court espoused not only the framework, 
but also the minimal standard of proof necessary to establish a Title VII 
claim at the summary judgment stage.79 
 The Ninth Circuit’s first reason for adopting the Title VII frame-
work for Title IX retaliation claims is that the legislative history of Title 
IX suggests that Congress meant for a similar standard to apply to Title 
IX.80 The court cited the House Report as saying that Title IX was 
meant bring in education under the equal employment provision.81 
Second, the court cited previous cases where it found the Title VII 
framework useful for assessing claims of discrimination and retaliation 
that do not fall within the Title VII or Title IX context.82 Most likely, the 
lower standard of proof required at the summary judgment level when 
applying the Title VII framework, levels the playing field for individuals 
litigating against large institutions with significant resources.83 The 
court also pointed out that the Supreme Court has often looked to Ti-
tle VII to shine light on Title IX cases of discrimination.84 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi II ), 673 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir.), amended by 698 
F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012). Ultimately the dissent concurred with the majority’s application 
of the Title VII framework but warned that extending the employment model to the 
graduate student-professor context is problematic because “[t]he academic process in-
volves highly personal, idiosyncratic relationships” that are inherently unique and highly 
subjective. See id. at 1231 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
77 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1223; Emeldi v. Univ. of Or. (Emeldi I ), No. 08–6346-HO, 
2010 WL 2330190, at *2 (D. Or. June 4, 2010), rev’d, 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012), amended 
by 698 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2012). 
78 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1224. 
79 Id. at 1223. 
80 Id. at 1224. 
81 Id. 
82 Id.; see, e.g., Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (ap-
plying the Title VII framework to a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
83 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1224. 
84 See id. 
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 In taking the effort to articulate its reasoning for adopting the Ti-
tle VII framework, the Ninth Circuit demonstrates a more thorough 
approach to examining Emeldi’s allegations.85 Not only did the Ninth 
Circuit consciously choose to apply the Title VII framework to the Title 
IX retaliation claim, the court repeatedly emphasized that to establish a 
prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment, the requisite de-
gree of proof is minimal and does not need to rise to the level of a pre-
ponderance of evidence.86 While acknowledging that the University 
might have a convincing case at trial, this lower standard enabled the 
court to hold that Emeldi’s allegations are still sufficient to create a 
genuine dispute of factual issues that could only be resolved by a jury.87 
 This lower burden of proof and broad reading, reinforces the 
purpose behind Title IX, which is that federally funded educational 
institutes cannot discriminate based on sex.88 Practically, by concluding 
that Emeldi’s allegations were non-speculative, the court suggested that 
student allegations of discrimination should be considered similar to 
that of constructively discharged employees.89 Therefore, even if a fed-
erally funded educational institution can provide compelling evidence, 
a student’s allegations are likely to be found non-speculative under the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Title IX, limiting the number of cases 
decided under summary judgment.90 Although this lower standard 
does pose the risk of both letting some unmeritorious claims go for-
ward and lowering the bar for institutional liability, these concerns are 
outweighed by students’ interest in discrimination-free graduate educa-
tion in light of the unique dynamic between advisors and Ph.D. candi-
dates.91 Students will now feel empowered that their complaints of both 
personal and institutional discrimination will be acknowledged, en-
couraging students to report incidents of discrimination in the univer-
sity setting.92 
                                                                                                                      
85 See id. at 1224. 
86 See id. at 1223, 1226, 1228. 
87 See id. at 1229–30 (noting that it is not speculative for Emeldi to say that she asked 
fifteen faculty members who declined for various reasons to supervise her dissertation). 
88 See id. at 1224–25. The court notes that the intent of Title IX is to “empower[] a 
woman student to complain, without fear of retaliation, that the educational establishment 
treats women unequally.” Id. at 1225. 
89 See Emeldi II, 673 F.3d at 1225. 
90 See id. at 1230. 
91 See id. at 1225. 
92 See id. at 1228. 
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Conclusion 
 The Ninth Circuit reached the appropriate conclusion in revers-
ing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the University. 
The district court hastily adopted the Title VII framework for estab-
lishing a prima facie case for Title IX retaliation claims, without imbu-
ing its analysis with careful consideration and awareness of the policy 
aims behind Title IX’s creation. By not only adopting, but also thor-
oughly examining Title VII’s framework, however, the Ninth Circuit 
found that Title VII claims for summary judgment require a lower 
standard of proof and broader interpretation, rendering student alle-
gations alone sufficient to establish questions of fact in retaliation 
claims under Title IX. 
